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THEODORZ rlODGES,

vs.

Case No. 19248

WESTER:-l PI LitiG & SrlEET C~, ·1P.'\NY,)
STATE INS'JRANCE Fu:rn a:id
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Responder. ts.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is a review of a final ord2r

~f

the Industrial

Commission of Utah which awarded Petitioner partial benefits
under Utah's worker compensation laws, but denied Petitioner
perDanent and total

bene~its.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER ADMINISTRTIVE BODY
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's

Supp~2mental

Order, which reversed

and denied a previously entered award of permanent totai
disability benefits.

Pet1t1cn~r

ca~lj

0r

his Social Security
b~neEJ_t

~asei

~'\F

0

301polc"'ental Order also reduced

arn $5,500.00 per year without curtailing

bene~its,

thus resulting in a weekly

Llpon ann~alized earnings

of $5,500.00 rather than

RELl!·~F
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reverse and rF:.nand t'.le '.Jrj._:r .)f t'ri·--::
the purpose of awarding
the

appropria~e,
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permanc~t
~eeklj

1
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In(~·1:-otr

0
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total iisability

f >

b~n~fits

at

compensation rate.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, Theodor" Hodges

("Hodges"), a 68-year-old

welder, was injured on February 23, 1981, during the course of
his employment with Western Piling & Sheet Company ("Western
Piling").

Hodges was loading a length of heavy

12-inc~

wall

pipe when the pipe suddenly fell, striking him in the right
shoulder.

(R.23-26.)
Prior to this accident, Hodges had been in the employ

of Western Piling for about a decade.

(R.23.)

As reflected in

the testimony of a co-employee at Western Piling, Hodges

W3S

man of pronounced vigor and energy:

Q.

I'd like you to tell us, before ~hat accide~c,
your opinion of Mr. Hodge's physical condition
to do the work he was doing.

A.

I felt he was capable and a real good man to
work with really.

Q.

Physically, though, was he active?

A.

Physically, he was really active.
He could
keep up with the •est of us young guys, and
I thought he was a super wor~er.

Q.

Did he move

and

s~iftly?

A.

Swiftly and accurately.

(R. 61.)

quic~ly

At age 65, Hodges began to receive So=isl SecL:rity
retirement benefits.

-2-

a

j~S

his

t~3~

Security

Sa~i3l

Q.

~ow, si~ce 10~ ha?e been on Social Security,
you have continued to work?
Is that correct?

A.

Well, you're encitled to wor~--well, like
this year, I can ~ake $5,500 and stay on
Social Security.

Q.

So you wo:k jJst enough to--

A.

I try to keep working to keep in shape.
Becduse if you lay around, you're not going
tc be worth a shit.
So I try to ~eep working.
I could use the money.
That's about what it
amounted to.
(R.42.)

Accordingly, at the time of his accident on February 23, 1981,
Hodges was working a full 40 hours per week
present intention to quit or reduce his

l?.241

with no

wor~load.

On the day following his accident, Hodges consulted
his chiropractor, who referred him to Dr. Gordon R. Kimball.
(R.30-31.)
injections.

Dr. Kimball began treatment with Cortisone
Within three days of receiving a full injection of

Cortisone to the left shoulder on April 6, 1981, Hodges
expe:ienced severe body swelling and pain in his joints.
weig~t

suddenlJ ballooned from

(R.30-12.)
3SY~?t~~3~i=

~~is

dr3m3~ic

ac~~rit1c

l~S

flac~-u~

His

pounds to 195 pounds.
of

~is

previously

c0njition remained so serious that on

JJne 19, 1981, Dr. Kimball admitted Hodges to the hospital and
obtained additional consultation from Dr. Paul
7

6.)

~iner.

(R.32-33,

?ou: days late:, while incapacitated and under medication
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in the hospital,
Di tu r i , a

ri e

~r.

Hodges was

inter;1i~d~J

d ~ s a 1 cons u l tan t h i r e d b 'J t

to evaluate the Fund's liability.
this interview,

~ ':. .J t ~

~1 '~'

(R.43-~4.)

:: ~ ~ J ~

j ..., ,

:\;; a rr:sult ot

the State Insurance Fund denied liability or

medical treatment received by Hodges after June 23, 1981.
(R.9.)

Hodges was then released from the hospical because he

could no longer afford the cost.

(R.52.)

Application was made to the Industrial Commission of
Utah for hearing on Hodges' claims.

At the conclusion of the

hearing on March 11, 1982, Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook was appointed
to head a medical panel and make an impartial evaluation of the
medical aspects of the case,
pre-existing conditions.
pertinent part,
and

(2)

(1)

including the effects of

Dr. Holbrook's report concluded,

in

that Hodges was 100% physically impaired;

that Hodges "total impairment excluding the generalized

arthritis is 35% permanent loss of body function",

26%

attributable to pre-existing conditions, and 9% attributable to
the accident on February 23, 1981.

(R.91.)

(Emphasis added.)

In testimony, Dr. Holbrook reiterated his evaluation that
Hodges' permanent disability is "35 percent
generalized arthritis."

(R.111.)

. excluding the

On August 24, 1982, the

Division of Rehabilitation Services submitted its report,
concluding that in light of his age and substantial physical
impairment:

"Mr. Hodges is not a good candidate for

rehabilitation."

(R.99.)

After receipt of these reports from Dr. Holbrook and
the Division of Rehabilitation Services,
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the

Ad~inistrative

Law

~0r~t 1

•
r:: x ~ 111:::: i ·,; ·~

:J

f

:-i l

-~

;. r -_ ':! ,.- i t

J

,=

C0nclusions of Law and Order

•m~nt

of Hodges'

bodily functions,

c ;·, n di ti on :

His functional disability is unquestionably due
to his gener3l12ed arthritis but there is no
5oubt that the 2pplicant is also significantly
affected by the 35% impairment attributable to
the earlier injuries combined with this accident.
This would most probably render him permanently and totally disabled when considered
in conjunction with his age, education and
experience.
The Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation has clearly indicated that he is
not a candidate for rehabilitation.
[T]he
applicant's impairment combined with employment
problems incident to age, education and
experience, are sufficient to render the
applicant oermanentlv and totally disabled
irrespective of any consideration of his
generalized arthritis. (R.101-02.) (Emphasis
added.)
The Administrative Law Judge accordingly awarded Hodges
permanent total disability benefits,

the maximum provided under

Utah's compensation laws.
Within a few days of this finding,

the Administrative

Law Judge reversed his conclusion that Hodges was permanently
and totally disabled and entered a Supplemental Order.
intact Finding No. 4 that "[Hodges']

He left

overall permanent physical

impairment attributable to conditions exclusive of the
generalized arthritis is 35%".
then ruled that

Hodg~s'

The Administrative Law Judge

permanent total disability was due to

his generalized arthritis which

beca~e

symptomatic after the

industrial inju:y and thus not compensable as a post-existing
condition.
The

~dministrative

Law Judge's Supplemental Order

-5-

also recomputed
only

be~n

Hodge~'

wort\ ing lon9

wJ;es.
enou~h

I nf

. -___j~-:h

1~

t r

r r 1 q' i
t

J·?J.C

~

eJ.r n t

1)

$5,500 allowed before his earning3 woulJ be

, I

:--1 r .
',,1,

off;~·

.iu.<

i 1

;

n

egai~~t

Social Security benefits, the Administrative Law Judge selected
the figure of $106.00

($5,500.00 divided by 52 ·..ieeks) as

representing Hodge's weekly earnings.

(R.138-39.)

This ·. .·as in

the face of uncontroverted testimony that at the time

o~

his

accident, Hodges was working a full 40-hour week and earning
$655.20 per week
$23.40 per hour).

(36 hours at $15.60 per hour;

four hours at

(R.23-24.)

After the applicant timely filed a motion to review,
the Industrial Commission of Utah summarily affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental Order en May 17, 1983.
(R.152-53.)

A petition for a writ of review was thereupon

filed with this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

HODGES' BENEFITS MUST BE BASED ON THE
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE FORi'lULA PROVIDED BY
LAW.

The Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it disregarded statutory and factual wage calculations and
substantially reduced Hodge's benefits because of his age or
other assumptions not supported by the record.
The Commission mistakenly asserts that Hodges could
only earn up to $5,500.00 per year before suffering an
against his Social Security benefits.
crue.

offs~t

This is simply not

Current Social Security law provides that after age 70,

there is no offset against wages earned.

-6-

42

u.s.c.

§403 (f\ (3);

1

I)

('

:-· ~

T)

~

l ,J 1 , J,

~

:) ( _, ) ( _

Tiic1s,

a man of Hodge's age

(he was

earn an uni irnited income 3nd still receive his full Social
Sec~rity

benefits.

It is t:njust to deny Hodges workmen's

compensation benefits based upon a false assumption about
income limitations in the Social Security laws, especially in
light of Hodges' pre-accident physical vigor and his abhorrence
of being iole.
At the time of his February 23, 1931, accident,
Hodges was a full-time employee of Western Piling, working 40
hours per week.

Under these circurntances, Hodges' benefits are

required by statute to be calculated upon the basis of his
weekly earnings at the time of the accident.

Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-75 (1), provides in pertinent part:

(T]he average weekly wage of the injured
employee at the time of injury shall be taken as
the basis upon which to compute the weekly
compensation rate and shall be determined as
follows:

*

*

*

(e)
If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage shall
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate by
the number of hours the employee would have
worked for the week if the accident had not
intervened.
"The statute clearly fixes the basis upon which benefits ace to
be computed,
ascert3ined,

3nd when that b3sis is capable of being definitely
the benefits may not be enlarged or

diminished because the injured employee may have had larger or
smaller earnings prior to the time of his injury in some other

-7-

or the same employment."
Commission, 62 Utah 45,
s i g n i f i can t 1 y ,

Mill.3rd Count'

217 P.
th~~

976

97~,

s t 3. tu t e

v.

Trod i;ci:-i

:1

(1923).

p r e s u in es th rl t

cl '1

i

~l

j

J ':" ~~

1

J

employee's weekly wages would have continued ind finitely but
0

for the injury.

Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v.

Commission, 84 Utah 481,

36 P.2d 979, 982

Industrial

(1934).

Because of

this presumption, an injured worker who had previously been
engaged in intermittent employment such as construction may
receive more in benefits than he would have received in wages
had he not been injured.
proper.

Such a consequence is entirely

Morrison-Merrill & Co. v.

Utah, 81 Utah 363, 18 P.2d 295, 298

Industrial Commission of
(1933).

Yet the redllced

benefits awarded to Hodges ignore the statutory presumption for
the 9recise reason rejected in Morrison-Merrill & Co., sup;:a,
viz., because Hodges might have received more in benefits than
he would have earned in wages.
In a similar case, a Texas court held that the fact
that a pulpwood hauler had intentionally limited his earnings
to protect his Social Security benefits in the previous y2ar
did not otherwise remove him from the clearly expressed
statutory formula for determining benefits on a weekly wage
basis.

Texas Employers'

S.W.2d

665

Insurance Association v. McMahon,

(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).

The court stated:

It is the wage-earning capacity which is
protected by the compensation act.
Even though
the claiment in the case before us mav have
been limiting his earnings at the t~ this
cause of action arose, he should be free to
change his mind.

-8-

509

35,500.00

vear but

~er

f~r

his injury is sheer speculation.

Even aside from the fact that deductions from his Social
Security benefits would have ceased at age 70, Hodges was free
at any time to earn as much as possible beyond the base level
of subsistance offered by Social Security.

Hodges was an

energetic worker who enjoyed work for its own sake.

Nowhere,

indeed, does the record show that Hodges limited his earnings
to $5,500.00 per year even before his accident.

It indictes

only that he was aware of the consequences of earning more than
this amount, and that he preferred working despite the
consequences.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-75(1), supra, presumes that
Hodges' weeKly wages earned at the time of his injury would
continue indefinitely into the future.

Park Utah Consol. Mines

Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 982.

The Commission

ought not be allowed to engage in speculation as to what a
claimant rniqht do in a future year.

Not only does such

speculation disregard the statutory presumption, but it has
resulted in predictions wholly at odds with the evidence.
Hodges' benef:ts should have been computed, as was correctly
done in the ;arninistrative Law Judge's original order, on the
basis of nis

av~rage

II.

Tne

w•ekly w3ge at the time of his injury.

HODGEo IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
PERMANENT TOT.'\L DISABILITY BENEFITS
BASED UPON THE FINDING OF 35% IMPAIRMENT,
EXCLUSIVE OF HIS ARTHRITIC CONDITION.
~edical

panel clearly and unequivocally found
-9-

that petitioner had a 35% per,canent physi,_.:i\

io,n:r ,,._.

the industrial injury and pre-existing cond it i ,,n-,
his arthritic condition.

(R.136.)

The

tc

::'_-~_I_:,'_':'.'._''

Admini~t·at1v2

Law Jud3e

found likewise, both in his original and supplemental ,rders.
The test for determining total disability under

the

Utah Workmen's Compensation Law is well established:
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if by
reason of the disability resulting from his
injury he cannot perform work of the general
character he was performing when injured, or by
other work which a man of his capabilities may
be able to do or learn to do.
United Park Mines Company v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410,
800, 801-02

(1964).

degree of disability,

393 P.2d

In determining an injured employee's
it is appropriate to consider factors

extrinsic to an industrial injury such as "age, mental ability,
prior training, and job market".

Northwest Carriers,

Industrial Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138, 141

Inc. v.

(Utah 1981).

The Division of Rehabilitation Services found that in view of
his age and physical impairment, there were no prospects for
Hodges'

rehabilitation.

Thus,

in his original order,

Administrative Law Judge found that Hodges'

the

"35% impairment

attributable to the earlier injuries combined with this
accident .

. would probably render him permanently and

totally disabled when considered in conjunction with hi3 age,
education and experience".

(R.101-02.)

The present case is almost identical to the
situation before this Court in Brundage v.
622 P. 2d 790

(Utah 1981).

In Brundage,

-10-

I~L

Freight,

Inc.,

the medical testimony

-, C) ~-

j ;- ' I

]~\

l

sl3ir.1aril:.

1

li'Tlitations,

s

available to him.

th:?r~

r~rmanent

w~.:rG

physical disability.

no occupations pr2sently

This Court properly held that in view of

such uncontradicted evidence,

the Commission "could not have

formed the bona fide opinion that plaintiff was not then
incapable of re-entering the labor market by reason of his
?hysical disabilities".

Id. at 792,

(quoting Buxton v.

Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 121, 123-24
Similarly in this case,
Hodges'

(Utah 1978)).

the uncontradicted evidence is that

35% impairment is permanent and that there is no

occupation presently available to him.

Accordingly, the

finding of 35% total impairment, when combined with Hodges'
age, education and experience, entitles him to an award of
permanent and total disability benefits.
III.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED
ARBITRARILY BY FAILING TO CONSIDER
CLAI~ANT'S ARTHRITIC CONDITION AS A
PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT.

All of the medical evidence demonstrates the
existence of a severe osteoarthritic condition becoming
sympt~matic

shortly after the industrial injury and concurrent

with the initia: treatments.

~o

amount of permanent partial

disability wis assigned to this condition.
and the

Admi~istra~~~e

condition

a~one

Law

J~d~e

The medical panel

simply found that this

was significant enough to render the claimant

permanent~y

totally disabled from employment.

panel

that this

f~~nd

diff~se

The medical

severe arthritic problem had its

-11-

onset subsequent to the accident of F.:_:.bruary ::.3,

not related to those events.

1·~:~1,

The pan.el ::lirl not f 1n 1

t:_

~11_

.-1l

severe arthritic problems were totally cost-existing.

"''1

ti1·

In fact,

they noted "previous multiple records in this patient indicate
pre-existing arthritic changes in the right shoulder, back and
left knee".

(R.91.)

1

While the severe symptomatic condition

may have occurred after the industrial injury of February 1981,
it is clear that the arthritic condition itself pre-existed
this industrial injury and had created significant enough
modifications to have been previously noted.
The Administrative Law Judge's initial determination
that Hodges was permanently and totally disabled from gainful
employment was made without reference to this arthritic
condition.

If the arthritic condition is considered, however,

as a pre-existing condition, whether or not it was symptomatic,
the Administrative Law Judge would presumably assign permanent
total disability to this condition alone, as well as to this
condition when considered together with all previous injuries.
The fact that the Administrative Law Judge simply
changed his mind was in and of itself an arbitrary and
capricious act in that it deprived claimant of an opportunity

1 see also, (1) R.84: November 30, 1957 x-rays showing "fairly
extensive hypertrophic arthritis in the lower dorsal and lumbar
spine"; (2) R.85: July 25, 1965 note showing "suggestion of
definite acromio-clavicular arthritis"; (3) R.35: 1956 report
from Dr. Howard re associated traumatic arthritis and "marginal
osteophytic spurring", and 1973 report showing traumatic
arthritis of the left knee; (4) R.86: 1974 report showing "two
arthritic shoulders and one arthritic knee may render further
employment unlikely".
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il):

1

l' \

~

i

in
'-==-

3~~

::1i.;abilit'/ '•''-:iJ1'J

r;.·-1r

l-1

i'."l

r~o'":.

render claixant totall;

i'

L:r:d

,-

r<0questing clarification of

i~

r'·"

cla irnant believed that his

nf

itself ha'1e been deemed to

disabl~d,

the claimant would have

objected to the medical panel report and thus sought
clarification of the panel's feeling that had claimant not had
an arthritic condition, he probably would have stabilized on or
about June 23, 1981, and
and permanently disabled.

~ay

or may not have then been totally

All of the panel's statements, as

well as the Administrative Law Judge's findings, are based upon
speculation as to what could or could not have occurred had he
not had osteoarthritis.

The fact remains that the claimant was

hospitalized on tne date he was supposedly stablized from his
industrial injury and was totally incapacitated from any work
whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial
Commission committed the following errors of law in this matter:
1.

Failing to find that Theodore Hodges is

permanently and totally disabled, despite uncontroverted
evidence that he is at least 35% impaired due to the industrial
accident and

pre-e~isting

conditions

(exclusive of arthritic

conditions);
2.

Fa1l1ng to c>nsider the pre-existing arthritic

condition in a determination of his total disability benefits;
3.
his actual

Failing to calculate Hodges' benefits based upon

avera~e

~eekly

wage at the time of his industrial

-13-

accident;
4.

Failing to applf the stacutor1

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-75 that Hodges' average

pc·s1m}~inn

w 0 ~kly

l~

wage at the

time of his industrial accident would have continued
indefinitely but for the accident; and
5.

Engaging in speculation, unsubstantiated by law

or by the evidence in this case, concerning the amount of work
Hodges would have chosen to perform had he not been injured.
Accordingly, the Commission's order denying benefits
should be reversed and remanded for the purpose of awarding
benefits for permanent total disability to Theodore Hodges, and
to properly calculate benefits in the manner contained in the
Administration Law Judge's original order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ::;-tf-day of February,
1984.
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Telephone:
533-8383

Attorneys for Petitioner
0698L
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A true and c0rrect copy of PETITIONER'S BRIEF was
plac0d in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following persons on this

!fl!-

day of February, 1984:

James A. Black
Suite 500
Ten West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT

84101

Frank V. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84104
Gilbert Martinez
160 East 300 South
P. O. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, UT

-15-
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